# The Common Information Approach to Decentralized Stochastic Control

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(Joint work with Ashutosh Nayyar and Aditya Mahajan)

#### • Communication Networks

- Communication Networks
- Sensor Networks

- Communication Networks
- Sensor Networks
- Transportation Networks

- Communication Networks
- Sensor Networks
- Transportation Networks
- Supply Chain Systems

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 Information of one decision-maker may depend on decisions made by other decision-makers.

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• In centralized stochastic control all decisions are made by a centralized decision maker who has access to all the information and has perfect recall.

• Key assumption of centralized stochastic control is violated in decentralized systems.

• Techniques from centralized stochastic control cannot be directly applied to decentralized stochastic control.

• Person by person approach

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• The designer's approach

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• Combination of person by person and designer's approach.

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• Methods exploiting the system's information structure.

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- Iterative process for determining person-by-person-optimal strategies (not globally optimal).

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  - Computationally formidable problem.

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• Stochastically nested information structure

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- Information sharing structures

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- Information sharing structures
  - Delayed sharing

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  - Periodic sharing

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  - Common and private observations.

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- Key features
  - Controllers sequentially share part of their past data (observations and control actions) with one another by means of a shared memory.
  - All controllers have perfect recall of the commonly shared data (common information).

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- A general solution methodology was presented in [NMT].
- Solution methodology based on the **common information approach** developed in Nayyar [Ph.D. thesis]
- Common information approach applicable to all sequential decision-making problems.

• Key idea

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  - Reformulate original decentralized stochastic control problem into an equivalent centralized stochastic control problem from the point of view of a fictitious coordinator who has access only to common information and selects prescriptions that map each controller's private information into actions.

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  - Reformulate original decentralized stochastic control problem into an equivalent centralized stochastic control problem from the point of view of a fictitious coordinator who has access only to common information and selects prescriptions that map each controller's private information into actions.
  - Solve the coordinator's problem using ideas from Markov decision theory
  - Translate the results back to the original problem.

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- A dynamic program for determining globally optimal strategies for all controllers.
- Structural results obtain by the common information approach can not be obtained by the person-by-person approach
- Dynamic program obtained by the common information approach is simpler than that obtained by the designer's approach.

• Provides a unified view of stochastic control

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• (Nayyar, Ph.D. Thesis)

• Illustrate the approach.

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• Present solution to 40-year old conjecture on delayed sharing information structures (Witsenhausen 1971).

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- Networked control systems.
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  - Static team example\*
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  - \*(illustrate how to simplify search of globally optimal strategies)

# Optimal Control Strategies in Delayed Sharing Information Structures



**Dynamic System** 

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$$Y_t^j = h_t^j \left( X_t, W_t^j \right), \ t = 1, 2, ..., \ j = 1, 2.$$

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's observations at  $t$ 

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$$\{W_t^2, t = 1, 2, 3, ...\}$$
 i.i.d. noise process

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•  $X_1, \left\{W_t^j, t = 1, 2, 3, ...\right\}$ ,  $j = 0, 1, 2$  mutually independent.  
• Note: All r.v.'s take values in finite spaces.

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$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I}_{t}^{j} &:= \left(Y_{1:t-k}, U_{1:t-k}, Y_{t-k+1:t}^{j}, U_{t-k+1:t-1}^{j}\right) \\ Y_{t} &:= \left(Y_{t}^{1}, Y_{t}^{2}\right) \\ U_{t} &:= \left(U_{t}^{1}, U_{t}^{2}\right) \\ Y_{1:t-k} &:= \left(Y_{1}, Y_{2}, \dots, Y_{t-k}\right) \\ U_{1:t-k} &:= \left(U_{1}, U_{2}, \dots, U_{t-k}\right) \end{aligned}$$

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#### DMs' Strategies

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$$g^j := \left(g_1^j, g_2^j, \dots, g_{\mathcal{T}}^j 
ight) \Rightarrow \mathsf{DM} \; j$$
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#### Instantaneous Cost

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#### Objective

• Determine a control/decision strategy

$$g^{1:2} := (g^1, g^2)$$
  
 $g^i := (g^i_1, g^i_2, \dots, g^i_T), i = 1, 2$ 

to minimize expected total cost

$$\mathcal{J}\left(g^{1:2}
ight) = \mathbb{E}\left\{\sum_{t=1}^{T} I_t\left(X_t, U_t^1, U_t^2
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### History of the Problem

• Structure of an optimal control strategy conjectured by Witsenhausen in 1971

$$U_t^j = g_t^j \left( P_t^j, \Pr\left(X_{t-k+1}|C_t\right) \right) \qquad (*)$$

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 Structure of an optimal control strategy has remained unknown when k > 1 until 2011 [NMT, IEEE TAC, July 2011].

 $\underline{\mathsf{Step 1}}$  - Show equivalence between the original system and coordinated system

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- System dynamics, instantaneous cost function, performance metric same as in original system
- Objective: Select a coordination strategy to minimize the expected total loss.



- The coordinator selects prescriptions  $\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2$ 
  - $\gamma_t^1$ : Space of DM1's private info  $\rightarrow$  Space of DM1's actions
  - $\gamma_t^2$  : Space of DM1's private info ightarrow Space of DM2's actions



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$$U_t^1 = \gamma_t^1 \left( P_t^1 \right)$$
,  $U_t^2 = \gamma_t^2 \left( P_t^2 \right)$ 



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$$U_t^1 = \gamma_t^1 (P_t^1), \ U_t^2 = \gamma_t^2 (P_t^2)$$
  
•  $\Gamma_t^1 = \psi_t^1 (C_t), \ \Gamma_t^2 = \psi_t^1 (C_t)$ 



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•  $\Gamma_t^1 = \psi_t^1 (C_t), \ \Gamma_t^2 = \psi_t^1 (C_t)$   
•  $\{\psi_t^1, \psi_t^2, \ t = 0, 1, 2, \dots, T - 1\}$  coordination law

Step 1 - Construct a Coordinated System

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- Plant dynamics, instantaneous cost function the same as in the original system
- Objective: Determine a coordination law

$$\psi := (\psi_0, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_{T-1}), \ \psi_t := (\psi_t^1, \psi_t^2)$$

so as to minimize the expected total loss

$$\mathcal{J}\left(\psi\right) = \mathbb{E}^{\psi}\left\{\sum_{t=1}^{T} I_t\left(X_t, \gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2\right)\right\}$$

Step 2 - Formulate coordinated system as POMDP

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• (unobserved) state

Step 2 - Formulate coordinated system as POMDP

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Step 2 - Formulate coordinated system as a POMDP

• State Process 
$$S_t, t = 1, 2, \cdots, T$$

$$\begin{split} S_t &= \left( X_t, P_t^1, P_t^2 \right) \\ P_t^i &= \left( Y_{t-k+1:t}^i, U_{t-k+1:t-1}^i \right), \, i = 1,2 \end{split}$$

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• Observation Process  $O_t, t = 1, 2, \cdots, T$ 

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$$A_t = \left( \Gamma_t^1, \Gamma_t^2 \right)$$

We can verify that

$$Pr(S_{t+1}, O_{t+1} | S_{1:t}, A_{1:t}) = Pr(S_{t+1}, O_{t+1} | S_t, A_t)$$
$$I_t(X_t, U_t) = \tilde{I}_t(S_t, A_t)$$

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• Decision problem at coordinator is POMDP.

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- Use Markov decision theory to identify:
  - the structure of optimal coordination strategies in the coordinated system.
  - a dynamic program to obtain an optimal coordinated strategy with such structure.

Step 3 - Solve the resultant POMDP

Let

$$\Theta_t(s) = \Pr\left(S_t \left| C_t, \Gamma^1_{1:t-1}, \Gamma^2_{1:t-1} \right.\right)$$

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• The realization  $\theta_t$  of  $\Theta_t$  updates according to

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_{t+1} &= \eta_t \left( \theta_t, y_{t-k+1}^1, y_{t-k+1}^2, u_{t-k+1}^1, u_{t-k+1}^2, l_t^1, l_t^2 \right) \\ & \text{(non-linear filtering equation)} \end{aligned}$$

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• There exists an optimal coordination strategy of the form

$$\Gamma_{2}^{1} = \psi_{t}^{1}\left(\Theta_{t}\right), \ \Gamma_{t}^{2} = \psi_{t}^{2}\left(\Theta_{t}\right)$$

Step 3 - Solve the resultant POMDP

• An optimal coordination strategy is determined by the following DP. Define:

$$V_{t}(\theta) = \min_{\gamma_{t}^{1},\gamma_{t}^{2}} \mathbb{E} \left\{ I_{T} \left( X_{T}, \gamma_{T}^{1}, \gamma_{T}^{2} \right) \middle| \Theta_{T} = \theta, \Gamma_{T}^{1} = \gamma_{T}^{1}, \Gamma_{T}^{1} = \gamma_{T}^{2} \right\}$$
(1)  
and for  $t = 1, 2, \cdots, T - 1$   
$$V_{t}(\theta) = \min_{\gamma_{t}^{1},\gamma_{t}^{2}} \mathbb{E} \left\{ I_{t} \left( X_{t}, \gamma_{t}^{1}, \gamma_{t}^{2} \right) + V_{t+1} \left( \eta_{t} \left( \theta, Y_{t-K+1}^{1}, Y_{t-K+1}^{2}, U_{t-K+1}^{1}, U_{t-K+1}^{1}, \gamma_{t}^{1}, \gamma_{t}^{2} \right) \right) \right\}$$
( $\Theta_{t} = \theta, \Gamma_{t}^{1} = \gamma_{t}^{1}, \Gamma_{t}^{2} = \gamma_{t}^{2}$ (2)

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(\Theta\_{t} = \theta, \Gamma\_{t}^{1} = \gamma\_{t}^{1}, \Gamma\_{t}^{2} = \gamma\_{t}^{2} \right\} (2)

For each t and for each θ ∈ Θ<sub>t</sub>, the optimal prescription is the minimizer of V<sub>t</sub> (θ).

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 $\frac{\text{Step 4}}{\text{coordinated system}} - \text{Show equivalence between original system and}$ 

• For any coordination strategy in the coordinated system, there exists a control strategy in the original system that results in the same expected total cost and vice versa.



Figure: Going from coordinated system to original system.

#### Lemma 1

Consider any choice of coordinator's policy  $\psi = (\psi_1^1, \psi_1^2, \dots, \psi_T^1, \psi_T^2)$  in the coordinated system. Define  $\mathbf{g^1}, \mathbf{g^2}$  as  $g_t^k(\cdot, C_t) := \psi_t^k(C_t)$ for  $k = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ . Then,

$$\mathcal{J}\left(\mathbf{g^{1}},\,\mathbf{g^{2}}
ight)=\mathcal{J}\left(\psi
ight)$$

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Figure: Going from original system to coordinated system.

#### Lemma 2

Consider any choice of decision makers' policies  $\mathbf{g^1}, \mathbf{g^2}$  in original system. Define  $\psi$  as

$$\psi_t^k(C_t) := g_t^k(\cdot, C_t)$$

for  $k=1,2,~t=1,2,\ldots,$  T. Then,  $\mathcal{J}\left(\psi
ight)=\mathcal{J}\left(\mathbf{g^{1}},~\mathbf{g^{2}}
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 $\underline{Step \ 5}$  - Translate the solution of the coordinated system to the original system

• Use the equivalence of the fourth step to translate the structural results and the dynamic program obtained in the third step for the coordinated system to structural results and dynamic program for the original system.

 $\underline{Step \ 5}$  - Translate the solution of the coordinated system to the original system

• For the *k*-th step delayed sharing information structure, there exist optimal control/decision strategies of the form

$$U_t^j = g^j \left( \mathsf{P}_t^j, \mathsf{Pr}\left(X_t, \mathsf{P}_t^1, \mathsf{P}_t^2 | \mathsf{C}_t 
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• If  $\psi_{1:T}^* = (\psi_{1:T}^{*1}, \psi_{1:T}^{*2})$  is an optimal coordination strategy (i.e. the solution of DP (1)-(2)), then an optimal control strategy  $g_{1:T}^* := (g_{1:T}^{*1}, g_{1:T}^{*2})$  is

$$g_t^{*j}(\cdot,\theta_t) = \psi_t^{*j}(\theta_t), j = 1, 2, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T.$$
  
$$\theta_t = \Pr\left(X_t, P_t^1, P_t^2 | c_t\right)$$

## Comparison with Witsenhausen's Conjecture

• Witsenhausen's Conjecture, 1971: There are optimal policies of the form

$$U_{t}^{1} = g_{t}^{1} \left( P_{t}^{1}, \Pr(X_{t-k+1}|C_{t}) \right)$$
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• Centralized stochastic control

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• If control strategy for the future is fixed as a function of future beliefs, current belief is a sufficient statistic for future cost under any current action.

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- Centralized stochastic control
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• If control strategy for the future is fixed as a function of future beliefs, current belief is a sufficient statistic for future cost under any current action.

• Optimal action is only a function of current belief on state.

Decentralized stochastic control

• Two difficulties



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  - (1) Any prediction of future costs must involve a belief on system state <u>and</u> some means of predicting other DMs actions (as cost depend on state and other DMs actions).

Decentralized stochastic control

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  - (1) Any prediction of future costs must involve a belief on system state <u>and</u> some means of predicting other DMs actions (as cost depend on state and other DMs actions).
  - (2) Different DMs have different information  $\Rightarrow$  beliefs formed by each controller and their prediction of future costs can not be *consistent*.

Common Information

• Beliefs based on common info are consistent among all DMs and can serve as a consistent sufficient statistic.

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- Based on (realization of) common info DMs can know how each DM will map its private info to control action.
- Common info beliefs and prescriptions must play a fundamental role in a general theory of decentralized stochastic control ⇒ fictitious coordinator.

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  - (ii) Sequential decomposition (DP) of the original problem.

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  - Each DM in the original system can solve coordinator's problem
  - Presence of coordinator allows to look at problem from the point of view of a "*higher level authority*"
  - Higher level authority simultaneously determines DMs' prescriptions.

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• Value function of POMDP piecewise linear and concave function of coordinator's belief

- Common Information
  - Connection of original problem with POMDP can be used for computational purposes.

• Value function of POMDP piecewise linear and concave function of coordinator's belief

• Efficient algorithms for POMDPs, based on the above property, exist.

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## • Common Information in other areas

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• Trading (Milgrom-Stokey 1978)

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## Thank you!